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FEDERAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES:
APPLICATION TO INGRESS AND EGRESS
S. P. MEYERS*

"Feeble indeed is an attack on a statute as denying equal protection which
can gain any support from the almost forgotten privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The notion that that clause could
have application to any but the privileges and immunities peculiar to
citizenship of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of
states, has long since been rejected." These words from the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey,' might well have been
the epitaph of the "privileges and immunities" clause.
Pri,ileges and Immunities Under 5th and 14th Amendments
The "privileges and immunities" clause was probably inserted in the
Amendment to transfer the protection of the common rights of citizenship
to the Federal Government, and to enable the Supreme Court to enforce
a national bill of rights.2 However, the clause met with disaster when first
expounded by the Court; albeit the Court divided five to four in the famous
Slaughter-House Casess The litigation involved the constitutionality of a
state statute creating a monopoly in I the slaughtering of animal and thus
withdrawing the business from approximately one thousand persons previously engaged therein. While the decision did not involve civil liberties
as such, its significance upon all the relations between state and citizen
motivated the conflicting interpretations developed by both sides.
The reasoning of the majority opinion was, in essence, that the wording
of the clause, "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States",
limited its protection to privilegeg and immunities of national citizens as
such. It did not protect those belonging to individuals as citizens of the
*The expressions of opinion herein contained are the personal opinions of the writer,
and may not, therefore, be represented as official Department of Justice opinions.
1296 U. S. 404, 443, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 265 (1935). The case involved the validity of a
Vermont tax statute which, in imposing an income tax on individuals, imposed
a tax on dividends earned outside the state of Vermont while exempting dividends
earned within the state. The statute was attacked as violative of the equal protection
and the privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland, concurred in by Hughes, C. J., and Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, and Roberts, 33., found the statute invalid as violative
of the privileges and immunities clause. Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, JJ. dissented.
2

See FLACK, THE Anoz'noN OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

LwcruRxs ON THE FOURTEENTH ARnCLE OF AmENDMENT (1898).

316 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (U. S. 1873).

(1908);
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states. The privileges and immunities of state citizens had been described
in Corfield v. Coryell4 as thoseWhich belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it
would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however,
be comprehended under the following heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. 5
These attributes of citizenship had existed prior to, and independent of
the Constitution, which commanded every state to treat citizens of other
states on a basis of equality in respect to privileges and immunities.6 The
majority opinion added the argument of expediency, namely that a contrary conclusion wowld set the Courf up as a "perpetual censor" of all
state regulation of local civil rights.'
The rationale for this narrow construction of the clause and the consistently exhibited reluctance -of the Court to enlarge its scope has been
placed upon another ground:
If its restraint upon state action were to be extended more than is
needful to protect relationships between the citizen and the national
government, and if it werd 'to be deemed to extend to those fundamental
rights of person and property attached to citizenship by the common
law and enactments of the states -when the Amendment was adopted,
such as were described in Corfield v. Coryell, supra, it 'Would enlarge
Congressional and judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it whose nature, though difficult to anticipate with precision,
would be of sufficient gravity to cause serious apprehension for the
rightful independence of local government. That was the issue fought
out in the Slaughter-Hoitse Cases, with the decision against enlargement.8
Ever since the Slaugh.ter-Hoitse decision, the "privileges and immunities"
clause has been construed consistently as protecting only interests, growing
46 Fed. Cases 546, No. 3,230 (1823), construing U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2.
5

1d. at 551.
616 Wall. 36, 77, 21 L. ed. 394, 409 (U. S. 1873).
7
1d. at 78, 21 L. ed. at 409. But see CoRwviN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREM COURT
(1934), c. 2.
8296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935); Mr. Justice Stone concurring in Hague v.
C. I. 0. 307 U. S. 496, 520-521, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 966-967 (1939).
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out of the relationship between the citizen and the national government,
created by the Constitution and federal laws.9 Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, approximately fifty cases have been brought before the Supreme Court in which statutes have been assailed as infringements of the "privileges and immunities" clause. 10 In only one, the Colgate
case, supra, was it held that the state legislation infringed on that clause.
The Colgate case was expressly overruled in slightly over four years.,
All efforts to extend the purview of the "privileges and immunities" clause
beyond the coverage of "interests, growing out of the relationship between
the citizen and the national government, created by the Constitution and
federal laws"' 2 have failed. Even basic privileges and immunities secured
against federal infringement by the first eight amendments have been held
not to be protected from state action by this clause.' 3 Reliance upon the
clause became a useless attempt to revive a lost cause. The Court, however,
has finally read a number of the safeguards of the Federal Bill of Rights
into the "due process" clause, thus accomplishing, in effect, what it bad
refused to do under the "privileges and immunities" clause. Thus the "due
process" clause may make it unlawful for a state to abridge, by its statutes,
9
1n re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 934 (1890) ; McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 12 (1892) ; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657,

661, 13 Sup. Ct. 721, 723 (1893) ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382, 14 Sup. Ct.
570,0 571 (1894).
1 See cases collected in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935).
Cf. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 520-521, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 966-967 (1939), n. 1.
"Madden v. Kentucky,. 309 U. S. 83, 60 Sup. Ct. 406 (1940). The Court at the time
of this decision was composed of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Stone,
Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas and Murphy. Only the Chief Justice and
Justices McReynolds, Stone and Roberts %vere also oni the Court at the time of the
Colgate decision. Hughes in a one sentence separate opinion concurred in the Madden
result upon the ground that the classification adopted by the legislature rested upon 4
reasonable basis. Roberts and McReynolds dissented upon the basis of the Colgate case.
This immediate! reversal of Colgate v. Harvey is a striking example of the statement
of Governor (later Chief Justice) Hughes, "We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution
is what the judges say it is."
12In re Kemler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 934 (1890); McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 12 (1892) ; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657,
661, 13 Sup. Ct. 721, 723 (1893) ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382, 14 Sup. Ct.
570,3 571 (1894).
1 The right to trial by jury in civil cases guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment,
Walker v. Savinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678 (1875) ; the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct 580
(1886) ; the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111
(1884); the right to bp confronted with witnesses contained in the Sixth Amendment,
West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 24 Sup. Ct. 650 (1904) ; the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448 (1900) ; the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination, Twining y. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup.

Ct. 14 (1908).
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the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment;14 or the like
freedom of the press ;15 or the freedom of religion ;10 or- the right of peaceable assembly, without which speech would be unduly trammeled ;17or the
right of an accused to the benefit of counsel.' 8 It should also be noted that
the refusal to include immunity from compulsory self-incrimination 9 among
the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States does not allow
20
the extortion of confessions through brutality or torture.
Federal Privileges and Immunities Listed
Despite the consistently exhibited reluctance of the Court to enlarge the
scope of the "privileges and immunities" clause, it has, of necessity, recognized that there are a few privileges and immunities of federal citizenship,
as such. While it has never seen fit to list the recognized privileges and immunities of national citizens-as early as the Slaughter-House Cases the
Court held itself "excused from defining the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States which no state can abridge, until some case
involving these privileges may make it necessary to do so"2 '--the Court
did gratuitously "venture to suggest some which owe their existence to
14De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 259-260 (1937); Herndon

v. Lowry, 301 U. S.242, 259, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 739-740 (1937).
.5Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936); Near v.
Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931),
16Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 262, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 204 (1934) ; Cf. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925) ; see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U. S. 444, 450, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 668 (1938) ; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 160,
60 Sup. Ct. 146, 150 (1939) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, 60 Sup. Ct.
900, 903 (1940) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 63 Sup. Ct. 669 (1943) ; Largent v.
Texas, 318 U. S. 418, 63 Sup. Ct. 667 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S.
105, 63 Sup. Ct. 870 (1943) ; Martin v. Struthers, '319 U. S. 141, 63 Sup. Ct. 862
(1943) ; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103, 63 Sup. Ct. 890 (1943) ; Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157, 63 Sup. Ct. 877 (1943): cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S.
568, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1942). See also Rotnem and Folsom, Recent Restrictions Upon
Religious Liberty (1942) 36, Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 1053.
171e Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937). Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 752 (1937). Cf. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup.
Ct.
954 (1919).
1
SPowell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932) ; Glasser v. United States,
315 U. S. 60, 62 Sup. Ct. 457 (1942) ; cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 Sup. Ct.
1252 (1942).
9
1
2 0Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936) ; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 472 (1940) ; Conty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629, 60 Sup. Ct.
612 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 60 Sup. Ct. 1032 (1940) ; Ward v. Texas,
316 U. S. 547, 62 Sup. Ct. 1139 (1942). Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332,
63 Sup. Ct. 608 (1942); Anderson v. United States, 318 U. S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599
(1942) ; United States v. Mitchell, Nos. 514-515, Oct. term, 1943, decided April 24, 1944.
2116 Wall. 36, 78-79, 21 L. ed. 394, 409 (U. S. 1873).
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the Federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its

Jaw 's.,,22

,

The first of such privileges and immunities suggested by the Slai hterHouse Cases is the right of a citizen of the United States, protected by implied guarantees of the Constitution, "to come to the sedt of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to
engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its
seaports, through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted,
to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several
States." 23 Of this, we shall speak later.
Another of the suggested privileges and immunities is "to demand the
care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty, and
property' when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government." 24 Of this there can be no doubt.
"The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances"
was also offered as an example of privileges and immunities of national
citizenship as such.2 5 This so-called right was squarely before the Court in
26

several later cases.

Other such privileges and immunities suggested by the decision are "the
right to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may
penetrate the territory of the several states" and "all rights secured to our
citizens by treaties with foreign nations."12 7 .
Still another such privilege and immunity suggested by the decision
is the privilege of habeas corpuis. And the Court very pointedly indicates
that the Fourteenth Amendment itself confers a privilege and immunity
upon citizens of the United States: "It is that a, citizen of the United States
can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State, of the Tnion by a
bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that
State."' 28 This is a recognition of the fact that, since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, national citizenship is the primary citizenship and
that state citizenship is derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United
at 79, 21 L. ed. at 409.
23Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25Ibid.
26
U. S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875); Hague v. C. I. 0.
307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
2716 Wall. 36, 79, 21 L.. ed. 394, 409 (1873).
2
81d. at 80, 21 L. ed. at 409.
221d.
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States and the citizen's place of residence. 29
In United States v. Cruiksank3 ° it was held that the right of people
peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adoption
of the Constitution; that it was, and always has been, one of the attributes
of citizenship under a free government; that it derived its source "from
those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout
the world" ;31 that it was not, therefore, a right granted by the Constitution.
However, there is strong dictum in the opinion that the right to peaceably
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances,
or for any other purpose connected with the powers or duties of the national
government is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the
protection of, and guaranteed by the United States. "The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."'3 2 This dictum would seem to be contradicted by Mainvell v. Dow. 3 However, in Hague v. C. I. O.,34 the right
is expressly recognized. The opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts states:
Although it has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment created
no rights in citizens of the United States, but merely secured existing rights against state abridgement, it is clear that the right peaceably
to assemble and to discuss these topics (the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act and the opportunities and advantages offered by it),
and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing,
is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States which the
Amendment protects.3"
and
Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a*name if
it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the
benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.b6
True, Mr. Justice Stone weakens this recognition by his separate opinion,
concurred in by Mr. Justice Reed, but he finds that the record and briefs
show that this argument was an afterthought without adequate support in
29
Hague v. C. I. 0. 307 U. S. 496, 510, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 956 (1939) ; Selective Draft
Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 165 (1918).

3092 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875).
31
1d.
32

at 551, 23 L. ed. at 591.
Ibid"
33176 U. S. 581, 595, 20 Sup. Ct. '448, 454 (1900).
34307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
351d. at 512, 59 Sup. Ct. at 961.
36Id. at 513, 59 Sup. Ct. at 961.
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the record. He pieferred to rest jurisdiction on the "due process" clause.
Chief Justice Hughes concurred with Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion that
the right to discuss the National Labor Relations Act was a privilege of a
citizen of the United States; but, not being satisfied that the record adequately supported the resting of jurisdiction upon that ground, concurred in
31
the basis for jurisdiction set out in Mr. Justice Stone's opinion.
Ex Parte Yarbrough38 established the right to vote for national officers
as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. In the earlier case of
Minor v. Happersett3" the Court had said.that the Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage -upon any one, and this was seized
upon by the petitioners in the Yarbrough case, which involved a prosecution
of election officials for conspiring to intimidate a citizen of African descent
in the exercise of his right to vote for a member of Congress. The Court
took great pains to distinguish the two cases and to indicate that the Court
in the Minor case -did not intend to say that, when the class of voters had
been determined in a given state, the right of each member of the class to
vote for representatives in Congress was not fundamentally based upon the
Constitution. The decision of the Yarbrough case, that the right to vote for
a member of Congress is secured by the Constitution, was most recently
approved in United States v. Classic:
The right of the people to choose, whatever its appropriate constitutional limitations, where in other respects it is defined, and the mode of
its exercise is prescribed by state action in conformity to the Constitution, is right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and hence
is one secured by it to
those citizens and inhabitants of the state entitled,
40
to exercise the right.

The opinion also recognizes that in a loose sense the right to vote for
representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from
the states; but points out that this is true only in the sense that the states
are authorized by the Constitution to legislate on the subject as provided
in §2, Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by
the exercise of its powers to regulate elections under §4, and its more general power under Article I, §8. The Classic opinion goes even further and
points out that the constitutional command is without restriction or limitation'and therefore the right, unlike those guaranteed by the Fourteenth or
37Id.

at 532, 59 Sup. Ct. at 964.

38110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152 (1881).

3921 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627 (U. S. 1874).
40313 U. S. 299, 314, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1037 (1941).
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Fifteenth Amendments, is secured against the action of individuals as well
as of states. 41
United States v. Waddell42 recognized a privilege and immunity of national
citizenship dependent not upon the Constitution, but upon a federal statute.
The defendants were indicted under the Civil Rights Statute3 for conspiring
to injure, oppress, intimidate, and threaten a citizen of the United States
in the free exercise and enjoyment of the statutory right of perfecting a
homestead.'4 Although the Homestead Act- granted a right of entry to
an alien who had declared his intention to become a citizen, as required by
the naturalization laws, as well as to a citizen, the conspiracy was held to
be within the purview of Section 51 'of Title 18 of the United States Code,
which by its express terms extends only to citizens. 4 6 This case seems to
indicate that where a right or privilege is conferred upon a large group
of persons, it is a privilege, and immunity of national citizenship whenever
any one of such 'persons happens to be a citizen of the United States. It
47
is not necessary that the right be conferred upon the citizen as such.
4
In Logan v. United States" it was held that a citizen of the United States
in the' custody of a United States marshal under a lawful commitment to
answer for an offense against the United States, had a right to be protected
by the United States against 'lawless violence and that this right is one
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. This right does
not stem from any of the amendments, but arises out of the creation and
establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government, paramount
and supreme in its sphere of action. Any government which has power
to indict, try, and punish for crime, and to arrest the accused, and hold
him in safekeeping until trial, is held to have the power and the duty to
protect its prisoners so held against lawless interference. From this duty
49
flows a correlative right of protection.
°
In re Quarles and Butler is another "civil rights" case wherein the
defendants were indicted for conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and
intimidate a citizen of the United States in his free exercise and enjoy41

1d. at 318, 61 Sup. Ct. at 1039.
U. S. 76, 5 Sup. Ct. 35 (1884).
43
REv.
STAT. § 5508 (1875), 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. § 51 (1940).
44
45 REv. STAT. § 2289 (1875), 12 STAT. 392 (1891), 43, U. S. C. § 161 (1940).
Ibid.
46
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656 (1887).
4T
See note 60 infra.
48144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617 (1892).
49
See Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Not To Be Lynched" (1943) 28 WAS.
UNiv. L. Q. 57.
50158 U. S. 532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959 (1895).
42112
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ment of one of the rights and privileges secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, namely the informing of a deputy marshal of
violations of federal criminal statutes. One of the grounds of demurrer to
the indictment, inter alia, was that there is no such right or privilege secured to citizens of the United States, qua citizen, as that set forth therein.
It was held that the right of a citizen to inform of violations of law, like
the right of a prisoner in custody upon a charge of such -violation, to be
protected against lawless violence, does not depend upon any of the amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and establishment
by the Constitution itself of a national government, paramount and supreme
within its sphere of action. Both are held to be within the concise definition of privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential
character of the national government, and granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.
Motes v. United States5l is a similar holding that in return for the protection received by a citizen under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the citizen, has the right and privilege to aid in the execution of the
laws of his country by giving information to the proper authorities of
violations of those laws. That right and privilege was held to be secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
52
To this meager list of judicially recognized privileges and immunities
of a citizen of the United States, there probably can be added the privilege
of expatriation 3 the right and privilege to enter the country and prove
one's citizenship;54
right and privilege
federal court ;56 the
Office;57 the right,

the privilege of resorting to the federal courts ;55 the
to be protected in the' enforcement of a decree of a
right to appear and testify as a witness before a Land
privilege and immunity of freedom from slavery or

51178
U. S. 458, 20 Sup. Ct. 993 (1900).
52
The words "rights," "privileges" and "immunities" are loosely used as interchangeable in various decisions. "Privileges and immunities" does not appear to have been
used in English constitutional documents and probably originated in a constitutional
sense in Art. IV of the Articles of Confederation. From there it was carried over
into the Constitution as originally adopted (Art. IV, Sec. 2). These words had no
precise legal definition at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For a discussion as to the legal definitions of all thr~e words see Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoniing (1913) 23 YA.E L J.
16; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 YAL L. J. 163; Corbin, Jural
Relationzs and Their Classification (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 226; Corbin, Rights anid Duties
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 501.
63Talbot v. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, 1 L. ed. 540 (U. S. 1795).
54Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (1908).
55
Terral v.-Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (1922).
5
GUnited States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C. C. W. D. Ga. 1890).
57
Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
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involuntary servitude ;5s and the rights secured by the "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 59
Narrowing of "Privileges and Invmunities" clause
Even a most cursory consideration of the privileges and immunities of a
national citizen, suggested by the Slaughter-House Cases or recognized by
later cases, makes it clearly evident that they include both privileges and
immunities conferred by national law upon citizens eo nomine, and privileges
and immunities conferred upon citizens in common with all other persons.
It would seem that a privilege and immunity enjoyed by a citizen of the
United States is no less his because it is enjoyed in common with other
people.60 Yet, in at least two decisions, the CoUirt seems to indicate a tendency
to carry the emasculation of the "privileges and immunities" clause even
further than did the definition or construction pronounced in the SlaughterHouse Cases.
In Bradwell v. State,61 the very next case decided by the Court after
the. Slaighiter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller used the following language:
We agree . . . that there are privileges and immunities belonging

to citizens of the United States, in that relation and character, and
that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge.
But the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not
58Smith v. United States, 157 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), cert. denied, 208 U. S.
618, 28 Sup. Ct. 567 (1907).
5916 Wall. 36, 80, 21 L. ed. 394, 409 (U. S. 1873). Cf. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S.
245, 261-262, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 204 (1934), where the Court, in a case involving the
validity of an order of the Regents of the University of California requiring every
able-bodied male student who, at the time of his matriculation, is under the age of
twenty-four, to enroll in a course in military science and, tactics, dismissed the argument that such order violated the privileges and immunities clause with this amazing
statement: "If the regents' order is not repugnant to the due process clause, then it
does not violate the privileges and immunities clause. Therefore, we need only decide
"whether by state action the 'liberty' of these students has been infringed."
60
1n United States v. Berke Cake Co. et al., 50 F. Supp. 311 (1943), the District
Court sustained a demurrer to an indictment under 18 U. S. C. § 51, charging a conspiracy to deprive citizens of the United States of rights granted by the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the rights involved
had not been granted to federal citizens qua citizens, but had been granted to citizen
and non-citizen alike. It is clear that this opinion is clearly wrong under all of the
cases discussed herein. A direct appeal to the Supreme Court (No. 329, October Term,
1943) was subsequently dismissed by the government when jurisdictional questions were
raised.
See Schweinhaut, Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice (1940) 1 BILL
OF RIGHTS REv. 206; Rotnem, Clarifications of the Civil Rights Statutes (1941) 2
BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 252; Rotnem, Federal Criminal Jurisdictionof Labor's Civil Rights
(Sept. 1942) LAwYERs GUILD REV. 21; Rotnem, Criminal Enforcement of Federal Civil
Rights (May 1942) LAWYERS GUILD REV. 18.
6116 Wall. 130, 21 L. ed. 442 (U. S. 1873).
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one of them. 6 This
right in no sense depends on citizenship of the
2

United States.

Taken literally this language would limit the "privileges and immunities"
clause not to privileges and immunities conferred by national law, but only
to privileges and immunities conferred by national law upon national citizens
eo nomine. The construction placed upon the clause by the Slaughter-House
Cases reduced it to mere surplusage as an unnecessary reiteration of a principle already clearly announced in the Constitution. Article VI, Section 2,
already provided that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land, .

.

. anything in the Constitution or Laws of any

State to the contrary notwithstanding.
This declaration of supremacy of national law contains all and more than
does the "privileges and immunities" clause as construed. In making national
law superior to state law, this Section protects against state law any person, citizen or non-citizen, in the enjoyment of any privilege conferred
upon him by national law, whether it be conferred upon him qua citizen
or otherwise. Why then a narrower and more emasculating definition or
construction under the "privileges and immunities" clause? It is doubtful
if Mr. Justice Miller was aware of the disparity between his statements
in the two cases.0
In Maxrwell v. Dowz 4 we find another example of this narrowing of the
construction placed upon the "privileges and immunities" clause. The case
presented this issue: "May a State provide for criminal trials in its courts
by a jury of less than twelve." 65 Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the
entire court with the exception of Mr. Justice Harlan, pointed out that the
rights granted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments were not
privileges and immunities conferred upon an individual as a citizen of the
United States, but are secured to all persons as against the Federal Government, irrespective of their citizenship.
As the individual does not enjoy them as a privilege of citizenship
of the United States, therefore, when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the abridgement by the States of those privileges or immunities
which he enjoys as such citizen, it is not correct or reasonable to say
02

1d. at 139, 21 L. ed. at 445.
63See McGovney, Privileges and Immunities (1918) 4 IowA L. BULL. 219.
64176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448 (1900).
6SCf. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930).
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that it covers and extends to certain rights which he does not enjoy
by reason of his citizenship, but simply because those rights exist in
favor of all individuals as against Federal governmental powers. The
nature or character of the right of trial by jury is the same in a criminal
prosecution as in a civil action, and in neither case does it spring from
nor is it founded upon the citizenship of the individual as a citizen
of the United States, and if not, then it cannot be said that in either
case it is a privilege or immunity which alone belongs to him as such
citizen....
In this case the privilege or immunity claimed does not rest upon
the individual by virtue of his national citizenship, and hence it is
not protected by a clause which simply prohibits the abridgement of
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Those
are not distinctly privileges or immunities of such citizenship, where
every: one has the same as against the Federal Government, whether
citizen or not.66
Maxwell *v. Dow anid Bradwell v. State cannot be reconcile d with the
dictum in the Slaughter-House Cases. The construction of the "privileges
and immunities" clause in that case is narrow enough to avoid any fundamental alteration in our constitutional system. There seems to be no compelling need for further narrowing of the construction. Moreover, the suggestion of these two cases is inconsistent with dicta and language in more
carefully reasoned cases. For example, in Twining v. New Jersey67 the
Court stated:
Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, on the
other hand, are only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of the National Government, or ard specifically granted or secured
to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States. 68
Twining v. New Jersey which post-dates both Maxwell v. Dow and Bradwell v. State, makes it safe -yto assume that the rule of the Slaitghter-House
Cases is the law, without the. narrowing embellishments of the Maxwell and
Bradwell cases.
When Privileges and Immunities Resorted to by Petitioner
At the risk of -repeating one of the platitudes of. the many atticles written
66176 U. S. 581, 595-596, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 454 (1900).

67See note 13 .pra.
68211 U. S. 78, 97, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 18 (1908). (Italics added) Cf. United States v.
Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 314, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1937 (1941) : "The right of the people
to choose . . . is a right established and guaranteed- by the Constitution and hence is
one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise the
same." (Italics added).
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on the "privileges and immunities" clause, it might be well, in passing to
point out the language in Presser v. Illinois:69
If the plaintiff in error has any such privilege he must be able to
point to the provision of the Constitution or statutes of the United States
by which it is conferred.
This may well account for the fact that in all the years which have passed
since the adoption of the clause no true example of infringement of a privilege
and immunity of the kind contemplated has been brought to the attenti6n of
the Supreme Court. It is true that many of these are secured by express
provisions of the Constitution. When such rights are involved, the aggrieved
party complains of the violation of such specific provisions. He could in
such cases also cite the "privileges and immunities" clause, but usually
does not. Only when the aggrieved party can find no federal guaranty of
the right alleged to have been infringed upon, based on a specific provision
of the Constitution or implied within the four comers thereof, does he fall
0
back upon the "privileges and immunities" clause in his desperationZ
Surely, in words of such promise, there must be some substance! Or perhaps
such reliance is in ignorance that these glittering words have lost their
luster. But be that as it may, the "privileges ahd *immunities" clause may now
be paraphrased: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities conferred by the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties of the United States upon any person who is a citizen of the United
States.
Denmse of "Privileges and Immunities" Clause
At the inception of this article it was stated that Mr. Justice Stone might
well have written the epitaph of the "privileges and immunities" clause.
This appeared almost certain after Palko v. Connecticut,71 which sustained
a state statute permitting the prosecution to appeal in a criminal case. This
decision is significant primarily for its attempt metaphysically to rationalize previous adjudications and to present them as component parts of a
harmonious pattern. The Court approved past decisions which had divided
various safeguards of the first eight amendments into a superior and an
inferior class in respect to their protection under the "due process" clause.
69116
U. S. 252, 266, 6 Sup. Ct. 580, 584 (1886).
70
The extent to which this desperation may sometimes go is typified by Connell v
State, 153 Ga. 151, 111 S. E. 545 (1922), where an attack was made upon a statute

prohibiting sexual intercourse with any female under the age of fourteen, as. abridging

privileges and immunities of a national citizen.
71302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937).

-
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Those which had been excluded "are not of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty. '7 2 Others, such as freedom of speech and of the press,
freedom of religion, and the right of peaceable assembly, are protected be73
cause "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrified."
This attempt to rationalize the decisions and to present them as component parts of a harmonious pattern serves only to indicate that the Court,
on occasions, uses natural law terms in two senses as descriptive of civil
liberties. It highlights the dangers of pladng too much emphasis on the
"tyranny of labels."74 For example, trial by jury was described by the Court
as "justly dear to the American people" and a "fundamental guarantee of
the rights and liberties of the people." 75 In Ex Parte Milligan"6 this right
was hailed as "one of the "xnost valuable in a free country" and "an inestimable privilege." Yet, Maxwell v. Dow, supra, indicates that in so far as the
states are concerned, this is not necessarily so. Again, in construing" the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court declared that the practices forbidden by these Amendments are "contrary to the principles of a free government," are "abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman," and "to the
instincts of an American," and "cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom?' 77 And in Gouled v. United States7s the
Court evalued both amendments as "indispensible to the 'full enjoyment of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property,' they are to be
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; .

.

. ."

Taken

literally these expressions by the Court are irreconcilable with Twining v.
New Jersey. It would seem that the Court says different things with the
same words; otherwise, the Twining-decision permits states to deprive individuals of a guarantee which would appear to be of the very essence of
a scheme of ordered liberty.
Any doubts as to the demise of the "privileges and immunities" clause,
which may have arisen as a result of the momentary resurgence of the
72

1d. at 325, 58 Sup. Ct. at 152.
73Id. at 326, 58 Sup. Ct. at 152.
74

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114, 54 Sup. Ct. 330, 335 (1934).
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 445, 7 L. ed. 732, 736 (U. S. 1830).
764 Wall., 2, 123, 18 L. ed. 281, 296 (U%S. 1866).
77
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 632, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 533 (1886).
78255 U. S. 298, 304, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 263, (1921). The Court also states that
the guaranties of the two amendments are "as important and as imperative as are
the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen, the right
to trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus and to due process." Again, taken literally
this language would place trial by jury on the same constitutional plane as the guaranties of the First Amendment and should have been carried over into "due process"
as was freedom of speech, etc.
75
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clause through Hague v. C.I.O., supra, should have been put to rest by the
almost immediate overruling of Colgate v. Harvey, supra, by Madden v.
Kentucky. 70 The Colgate case was the lone exception to the consistently
exhibited reluctance of the Court to enlarge the scope of the clause. Hague v.
C. I. 0. came close to being a second exception, but it must be remembered
that the privilege there involved, to assemble peaceably to discuss national
legislation, had been suggested by the Slaughter-House Cases, supra, as a
privilege and immunity of a national citizen and had been recognized by
the dictum of the Cruikshank case, supra. Then came Madden v. Kentucky,
80
followed shortly thereafter by the case of Edwards v. California.
The Edwards case involved 'a conviction under a state statute declaring
it to be a misdemeanor for any person to bring, or assist in bringing, into
the State, any non-resident, knowing him to be an indigent person. A
majority of the Court held the statute invalid as an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce.81 However, Mr. Justice Douglas, in an opinion
concurred in by Mr. Justices Black and Murphy, and Mr. Justice Jackson
in a separate opinion, found the state statute invalid without recourse to
the "commerce" clause. They placed their reliance entirely upon a privilege
and immunity of national citizenship, the right to pass freely from state to
state, the right of ingress and egress.
Ingress and Egress: A Federal "Privilege"
As already indicated, the first of the privileges and immunities which
the Slaughter-House Cases "ventured to suggest" was the right of the citizen
to come to the seat of government, etc. This right was bottomed on Crandall
v. Nevada, 2 decided prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The legislature of Nevada had enacted a capitation tax of one dollar upon
every person leaving the state by railroad, stage coach, or other means of
transportation for hire. Crandall, who was an agent of a stage coach company carrying passengers through the State of Nevada, was arrested for
refusing to report the number of passengers carried by his company and for
refusing to collect and pay the tax imposed. His defense was the unconstitutionality of the statute. The state defended the statute before the Supreme
Court as not being in conflict with either the constitutional provision con79

See note 11 supra.

80314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164 (1941).

SIt should be noted that the briefs for both the appellant and the appellee in this
case recognized that the issue ultimately involved the constitutional rights of the migrant Duncan and not those of Edwards himself'.
826 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 745 (U. S. 1867).
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ferring on Congress the power to regulate interstatecommerce, or the provision forbidding any State, without the consent of Congress, to lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports.
Mr. Justice Miller wrot6 the majority opinion. After determining that
the tax in question was one levied upon the passenger for the privilege
oi leaving the state or passing through it by the ordinary mode of passenger
travel, the Court next proceeded to determine that the tax was not in conflict with the constitutional provision against state levies on exports; and
as to the "commerce" clause, it was held that the legislation was permissible
as Congress had not yet legislated on this matter. However, the majority
opinion did not concede that tlhe question before the Court .was, determinable solely by these two clauses of the Constitution. The opinion pointed out
that the people of the'United States constitute one nation; that they have
a national government which had certain rights which the states could not
infringe upon. From these rights there flowed correlative rights to the
citizens of that national government. These were stated to be the right
to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, or to transact any, business he may have with it; to seek
its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.
Also included were the rights to free access to its seaports, to the subtreasuries, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several states.
All of these were said to exist independent of the will of any State over whose
soil the citizen must pass in the exercise thereof.8 3 There is little question
but that the opinion as written was based upon the proposition that the
statute directly 'burdened the performance by the United States of its func-84
tions, and also limited rights of its citizen' growing out of such functions.
The right of ingress and egress was next before the Court in Williams v.
Fears,8 5 involving an attack upon a Georgia statute which imposed a specific
83

Art. IV, §2 cannot explain this decision as the statute in question applied to citizens of Nevada as well as to citizens of other states. There was no discrimination
against citizens of other states iti favor of citizens of Nevada. See Hague v. C. I. 0.,
307 4 U. S. 496, 511, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 963 (1939).
8 "The views here advanced are neither novel nor unsupported by authority. The
question of the taxing power of the States, as its exercise has affected the functions of
the Federal Government, has been repeatedly considered by this court, and the right
of the States in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that
government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly
denied." 6 Wall. '35, 44-45, 18 L. ed. 745, 748 (U. S. 1867). It should be noted that
the position of the majority of the Court on the commerce question has been overruled
by subsequent decisions. It is now well recognized that the passage of state lines by
human beings constitutes interstate commerce. See Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky,
279 U. S. 245, 251, 49 Sup. Ct. 279, 281 (1928).
85179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128 (1900).
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tax upon many occupations, bztdr alia, that of emigrant agent. The statute
was squarely attacked as an interference with the right of a citizen to move
from one state to another, abridging the "privileges and immunities" clause;
and the Court first considered this argument. The language of the opinion
appears to recognize the principle, though the effect of the decision was to
destroy it.
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one
place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the
territory of any State ip a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
and by other provisions of the Constitution.86
After this recognition of the principle, the Court found the law under review
to be a taxing statute, levied upon occupations, including that of emigrant
agent.
If it can be said to affect the freedom of egress from the State, or
the freedom of contract, it is only incidentally and remotely. The individual laborer is left free to conie and to go at pleasure, and to make
such contracts as he chooses, while those whose business it 'is to induce
persons to enter into labor contracts and to change their location, though
subjected to taxation in respect of their business
left free to contract, 8are
7
as other citizens are.
*

*

*

In fine, we hold that the act does not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment in the particulars named.88
After a gentle pat on the back in Twining v. New Jersey the right of
ingress and egress ran afoul of the Slaughter-House Cases doctrine in
Wheeler v. United States.89 More properly, however, this case involved the
right to remain in a state. The case came before the Court on direct appeal
from a judgment below, quashing an indictment under the civil rights statute
alleging a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate citizens
of the United States "of rights or privileges secured to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the right and privilege peaceably to
8

1d. at 274, 21 Sup. Ct. at 129.

87

Md. at 274-275, 21 Sup. Ct. at 129. Cf. same case in court below, Williams v. Fears,

110 Ga. 584, 591, 35 S. E. 699, 701-702: "But the law, under consideration in the

-present case neither regulates nor restricts the right of citizens of this state to leave
its territory at 'wil1, nor to hold free communication with the citizens of other states.

The citizen may leave when he pleases, but the person who makes it a business of
inducing him to go to perform labor elsewhere must pay an occupation tax. This is
certainly no infringement upon the right of the citizen." 881d. at 276, 21 Sup. Ct. at 130.
89254 U. S.281, 41 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920) : the so-called Wobbly Deportation case.
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reside and remain in the State of Arizona and to be immune from unlawful
deportation from that State to another." 90 The lower court quashed the indictment on the ground that no power had been delegated by the Constitution to the United States to forbid and punish the wrongful acts complained
of, as the right to do so was exclusively reserved by that instrument to the
several states.
Recognizing that the right relied upon arose, if at all, by implication from
the Constitution as a whole and the consequences inevitably produced from
the creation by it of the National Government, 9' the Court laid down certain
doctrines which were said to be so well founded in reason and so conclusively
sustained by authority as to be indisputable. First, in all the States, from
the beginning down to the Articles of Confederation, the citizen thereof
possessed the fundamental right peacefully to dwell within the limits of
their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to
have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority
in the States to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right. Second, the Articles of Confederation secured uniformity by reserving in the
States the authority they had theretofore enjoyed, but subjected such authority to a limitation inhibiting the power from being used to discriminate.
And third, the Constitution plainly intended to preserve and enforce the
limitation as to discrimination imposed upon the States by Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation, and thus necessarily assumed the continued possession by the States of the reserved power to deal with free residence, ingress
and egress. This last doctrine became a foregone conclusion "because the text
of Article IV, §2, of the Constitution, makes, manifest that it was drawn
with reference to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation
and was intended to perpetuate its limitations; .... -92 Accordingly, the
judgment below was sustained because "no basis is afforded for contending
that a wrongful prevention by an individual of the enjoyment by a citizen
of one State in another of rights possessed in that State by its own citizens
was a violation of a right, afforded by the Constitution. '93 This was held
to be a necessary result of Art. IV, §2, which was held in the SlaughterHouse Cases to be directed solely against state action.
90
1d. at 292, 41 Sup. Ct. at 133.
"91 Cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875); Logan v.
United States, 144 U. S.263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617 (1892); In re Quarles and Butler, 158
U. S. 532, T5 Sup. Ct. 959 (1895); Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 20 Sup.
Ct. 993 (1900).
92254 U. S.281, 294, 41 Sup. Ct. 133, 134 (1920).
93
1d. at 298, 41 Sup. Ct. at 135.
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The entire decision in the Wheeler case revolves around Article IV, §2,9 4
and quotes at length from the Slaughter-House Cases and from the cases
quoted therein: Corfield v. Coryell,95 Paul v. Virginia 8 and Ward v. Maryland. 7 In all of these cases there are expressions to the effect that the right
of free movement of persons is an incident of state citizenship which is protected against discriminatory state action by Article IV, §2. But it is significant that, after referring to and quoting from these cases, Mr. Justice
Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-Houie Cases did "venture to suggest"
the right as one of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, and
not as an attribute of state citizenship.
It is surprising, to say the least, that the argument for the Government in
this case is that the Fourteenth Amendment has had no- effect upon the
question presented in this case, except incidentally in so far as it has, perhaps, enlarged and constitutionally fixed the status of a citizen of the
United States, which status, the government contends, was fully recognized
before the Amendment. It would seem that a sound argument could have
been made around the words of Mr. Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter House Cases:
The States have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict
their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States
has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he
chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with
every other citizen; and 98the whole power of the nation is pledged to
sustain him in that right.

National citizenship results from the mere circumstance of birth within the
territory and jurisdiction of the United States. State citizenship depends
94
Mr. Chief Justice White's almost deliberate effort to avoid committing either
himself or the Court on the issue whether the rights involved were attributes of national citizenship seems difficult to understand after his vigorous declaration only a
year earlier in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 164
(1918) : "We briefly direct attention to the Amendment for the purpose of pointing out
...how completely it broadened the national scope of the Government under the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant insstead of being subordinate and derivative, and, therefore, operating as it does upon all
the powers conferred by the Constitution, leaves no possible support for the contentions

made . .. .
9

SSee note 4 sitpra.
908 Wall. 168, 180, 19 L. ed. 357, 360 (U. S. 1868).
9712 Wall. 418, 430, 20 L. ed. 449, 452 (U. S. 1870).
9816 Wall. 36, 112-113, 21 L. ed. 394, 420 (U. S. 1873). See also Mr. Justice
Miller's majority opinion, id. at 80, 21 L. ed. at 410: "One of these privileges is
conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United
States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a
bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State."
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on the additional factor of residence, and is obtained or lost therewith. If the
national citizen has a right to enter the State of his choice and obtain state
citizenship by residence therein, 99 he has an equal right to remain -in a
State in order to retain that citizenship. An alien admitted to the United
States under the Federal law was declared in Truax v. Raich'0 0 to have been
admitted "with the privilege of entering and abiding in the United States,
and hence of entering and abiding in any State of the Union."''1 1 It is incomprehensible that a citizen should have any lesser right to enter and abide
in any state. Any lawless interference with either the rightto enter to obtain
state citizenship or the right to remain in the state to retain such citizenship
is an abridgment thereof.
After stating the basis for its decision in United States v. Wheeler, the
Court points out that Crandall v. Nevada; suipra, is inapplicable, not only
because it involved state action, but because the statute considered in that
case was held to burden directly the performance by the United States of its
governmental functions and also to limit the right of citizens growing out
of such functions. It was stated as a sequitur that the observation made in
*Taining v. New Jersey, supra, to the effect that the Crandall case had held
that the'privilege of passing from state to state was an attribute of national
02
citizenship might be disregarded in the Wheeler case as inapposite.
Sinde Colgate v. Harvey was so soon overruled, the case is worthy of
mention here only to point out that notwithstanding the Wheeler case, Crandall v. Nevada is still cited for the proposition that the right to pass freely
from one State to another is undoubtedly among the privileges and immunities of a national citizen.' 0 3
In the Edwards case, supra, appellant's brief stressed the passage of persons from State to State as being interstate commerce and argued that the
statute in question invaded the power of the national government over such
commerce. As a further argument, it was claimed that the statute deprived
the migrant of "liberty without due process of law." No effort was made
99
See WILLOUGHBY, THE U. S. CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1929) 345, "By the mere act
of taking up residence within a state, which that state cannot .prevent, a federal
citizen, ipso facto, becomes a state citizen .... The federal Constitution fixes that once
for all."
100239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915).
lO1d,
at 39, 36 Sup. Ct. at 9.
10 2 The Court was very careful, however, to confine its decision to the case actually
before it, and clearly indicated that nothing said in the 'case was to be construed as
"implying a want of power in the United States to restrain acts which, although
involving ingress or egress into or- fron a State, have for their direct and necessary
effect an interference with the performance of duties which it is incumbent upon the
United States to discharge, as illustrated in the Crandall case."
103296 U. S.404, 429, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 258 (1935).
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to prove the invalidity of the statute as abridging privileges and immunities
of a national citizen.104 The brief amicus filed by the Select Committee of the
House of Representatives of the United States' ° 5 claims in its opening paragraph that the statute "contravenes the privileges and immunities clauses
of the Constitution, Article IV, §2; Fourteenth Amendment." The brief
then argues, "Article IV, §2, like Article IV of the Article- of Confederation,
was intended to insure to each of the citizens of the several States the fundamental right to move about freely and easily from 'State to State in search
of opportunity." 6 But no argument was made that the right was a privilege
and immunity of citizens of the United States and that the state statute,
abridging the right, was invalid under the "privileges and immunities" clause.
The brief anicus also stressed the "commerce" clause and further claimed
that the statute violated the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The majority opinion of the Court rested squarely on the
"commerce" clause, and it was stated, "In the view we have taken, it is
unnecessary to decide whether this Section is repugnant to other provisions
07
of the Constitution."'
In light of the arguments made in appellant's brief and in the brief amicus,
it seems significant that Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy declined to
express a view on whether or not the statute ran afoul of the "commerce"
clause, and based their opinion upon the premise that the right to move
freely from state to state is an incident of national citizenship protected by
the "privileges and immunities" clause of 'the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr.
Justice Jackson concurred in the result reached by the Court, and, agreeing
that the grounds of its decision are permissible ones under applicable authorities, indicated his objection to resting the conclusion on the "commerce"
clause. He also based his opinion upon the "privileges and immunities"
clause.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion is of particular interest because, after quoting
the Twining v. New Jersey doctrine that "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . are only such as arise out of the nature and
104
"Freedom of movement and of residence must be a fundamental right in a democratic State. Whether within the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or within the term liberty in the due process clause, it is a basic constitutional right, the more valuable to those who migrate because of economic compulsions." This is the only mention of the privileges and immunities clause in appellant's
brief, Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 163, 62 Sup. Ct. 164, 165 (1941).
' 305Appointed pursuant to House Resolution
No. 63, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 22,
1940), to investigate migration of destitute citizens.
106314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164 (1941).
107 1d. at 177, 62 Sup. Ct. at 168.
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essential character of the National" Government, or are specificall granted
or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United
States,"' 08 it cites Crandallv. Nevada as an authority, ante-dating the Amendment, for the proposition that the right to pass freely from state to state
was recognized as a right fundamental to the national character of the federal government. It recognizes that the Crandall case emphasized that the
Nevada statute would obstruct the right of a citizen to travel to the seat of
national government, etc., but points out that there was not a shred of
evidence in the record of that case that the persons there involved were en
route on any such mission. It is stated that the point which Mr. Justice
Miller made was merely illustrative of the damage and havoc which 'would
ensue if the states had the power to prevent the free movement of citizens
from one state to another. Accordingly, the dictum in the Wheeler case, attempting to limit the Crandallcase to a holding that the statute there in question directly burdened the performance by the United States of its governmental functions and limited the rights of citizens growing out of such functions, was disapproved as not bearing analysis.
Mr. Justice Jackson in his opinion, without dttempting to ignore or belittle
the difficulties of the almost forgotten "privileges and immunities" clause,
points out that the difficulty of the task does not excuse the Court from giving
general and abstract words "whatever of specific content and concreteness
they will bear as we mark out their application, case by case."' 0 9 He advocates
that the Court should hold squarely that it is a privilege and immunity
of national citizenship to enter any State either for a temporary sojourn or
for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant
citizenship thereof. "If national citizenship means less than this, it means
nothing."" 0
In further support of this premise, the opinion sets forth an additional
argument on the basis of the obligations of such citizenship: Every national
citizen, under the Constitution, owes a duty to render military service."
His right to migrate to any part of the Union he must defend is a right
that must be respected under that instrument. "Unless this Court is willing
to say that citizenship of the United States means at least this much to the
citizen, then our heritage of constitutional privileges and immunities is
only a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion
2
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.""1

108314 U. S.160, 178, 62 Sup. Ct. 164, 169 (1941).

09
1d. at 183, 62 Sup. Ct. at 171.
110514 U. S.160, 183, 62 Sup. Ct. 164, 171 (1941).
"'1Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 378, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 161 (1918).
112314 U. S. 160, 186, 62 Sup. Ct. 164, 172 (1941).
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Recent Interest in Ingress and Egress
And that is the present status of the "right of ingress and egress"-to
be or not to be a privilege and immunity of 'a citizen of the United States,
that is the question. Ever since the onset of the depression, the right has
become one of major importance. Many states, in an effort to limit the migration of indigent workers and farmers, passed statutes similar to the
California statute overthrown in the Edwards case.113 With the transition
from the depression years to a war-time economy, the migration of war
workers has reversed the process. Now, with the manpower shortage, states
are endeavoring to prevent the egress of workers to more profitable war
jobs. In some states this has resulted in renewed efforts to enforce immigrant Agent License Acts, 1 4 efforts which involve the right of egress indirectly rather than directly.
Recently a case arose in Florida under such an Act, which is practically the Edwards case in reverse. A C.I.O. union official was held
on the ground that he failed to secure the license required by the recently
enacted Florida statute 1 5 before recruiting a number of agricultural laborers
for work in New Jersey during the canning season there. Necessary clearance for these laborers had been secured from the United States Employment Service of the War Manpgwer Commission, and the union official
was expected to refer the workers to the Employment Service which was
to act as the recruiting agency. It is not clear whether he went beyond
this limited activity and engaged in active recruiting. In any case, the laborers
were allowed to depart, but the union official was held for violation
of the state law. just as Edwards, in Edwards v. California,was arrested for
aiding Duncan in the exercise of his right of ingress, it may be said that
this union official was arrested for aiding the laborers in their right of
egress. If this case or a similar one reaches the Supreme Court, the wealth
of material available in the hearings of the committee investigating defense
migration, commonly known as the Tolan Committee, 1 6 may make possible
the writing of a "Brandeis brief," which will lead the Court to overrule
17
Williams v. Fears."
"13 For lengthy discussion of contemporary significance of ingress and egress with
reference to the migration of war, workers, and analysis of pertinent statutes, see
Roback, Legal Barriers to Interstate Migration, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286 and 483.
"14Ibid.
115
LAws OF FLA. 1943, Gen. Laws, Vol. 1, ch. 22068, p. 833.
"16 Roback, op. cit. supra note 113.

117See note 85 supra.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29

Conclusion
The interest shown by the War M,1anpower Commission in the Florida
emigranlt agent case, and the gendral overall problem of manpower make
it clear that the Federal Government has a stake in the final determination
of the issue. Since the Edwards case there is no question but that state action
to limit labor migration runs afoul of the "commerce" clause. But what of
those situations where private individuals act to prevent either ingress or
egress? Such activities can be reached criminally only under the Civil Rights
Statute, 118 provided, of course, that the right is a privilege and immunity
of a citizen of the United States. If the right of ingress and egress is
formally recognized as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, it
arises out of the creation by the Constitution of a national government,
paramount and supreme in its sphere of action. Like the right to vote, the
right to protection while in the custody of the United States, and the right
to inform of violations of law, the constitutional command is without restriction or limitation; and the right is secured against the action of individuals
as well as of states. 119
It was inevitable that the Federal Government would, upon the occurrence
of the necessary acts, make a test case under Section 51, Title 18120 and
present the Court with an opportunity to pass directly on this all important
question. The proper case will present to the Court the sole issue: Is the
right of ingress and egress a privilege and immunity of a citizen of the
11SRev. Stat. §5508 (1875); 35 Stat. 1092 (1909) 18 U. S. C. §51 (1940) : "If two
or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, dr because of his having so exercised the
same, . . . they shall be fined not more than $5000 and imprisoned not more than
ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor,
profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
119 The interference by state officers with the recognized right of ingress and egress
comes clearly within the purview of 18 U. S. C. §52: "Whoever, under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, . . . shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both."
As to what constitutes state action under "color of law," see Ex Parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 347, 25 L. ed. 676, 679 (1879); Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 287, 33 Sup. Ct. 312, 314 (1913); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 246, 52 Sup. Ct. 133, 136 (1931) ; United
States v. Classic, 313 U. -S. 299, 326, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1043 (1941) ; Culp v. United
States, 131 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); Catlette v. United States, 132 F. (2d)
902, 906 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943); United States v. Sutherland,,737 F. Supp. 344 (N. D.
Ga. 1940).
12035 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §51 (1940).
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United States; secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States?
The Court must then, of necessity, review the merry-go-round of present
opinions and -make a clear-cut decision. Until then, we need not decide
whether or not Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone wrote the epitaph
of the "privileges and immunities" clause.

